The “problem” of participation in cultural policy by Jancovich, Leila & Stevenson, David
 pg. 1 
The “problem” of participation in cultural policy 
 
Acknowledgements: the authors gratefully acknowledge funding for this research 
from the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
 
Introduction  
The need to increase recorded rates of cultural participation has become a recurring 
trope within cultural policy discourse. Internationally governments have 
commissioned research to measure who takes part in different cultural activities and 
developed policy initiatives to address perceived failings (see UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics, 2012 on international approaches). Commonly this assumes that the cultural 
offer is beyond reproach, but it is the participant who must change in order to be able 
to take up the opportunities that are on offer.  In other words certain patterns of 
cultural participation are represented as a problem caused by a deficit amongst 
individuals and state intervention is needed to build the capacity of individuals to take 
part in what is represented as mainstream culture (Miles and Gibson, 2017). In 
Denmark for instance, despite government surveys demonstrating high and stable 
rates of participation in civic activities, declining rates in specific art forms such as 
theatre and classical music are still seen as a problem for cultural policy to solve 
(Jancovich and Hansen, 2018).  
 
However, the aspirations that cultural policy has set out in this regard have broadly 
failed. In the UK for example, which is the focus of this chapter, despite almost two 
decades of sustained policy interventions and associated measurement, the headline 
rates of cultural engagement (in those practices which cultural policy measures) 
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appear to have changed very little (Neelands et al., no date). Yet recent research 
analysing the breadth of people’s everyday participation has shown the value that 
people place in their own active participation across a range of other cultural and 
creative practices (Crossick and Kaszynska, 2016; Miles and Gibson, 2017). This 
academic activity is mirrored by the growing number of organisations (for example: 
Voluntary Arts, 64 Million Artists, Fun Palaces) campaign for cultural policy to better 
recognise and support amateur creative expression. They argue that this would better 
meet the needs of a diverse culture, than the current narrow focus on the professional 
arts. Such work challenges the very the notion of ‘non-participation’ as a ‘problem’ 
and instead questions the legitimacy of taste hierarchies on which established cultural 
policy is founded (Stevenson, Balling and Kann-Rasmussen, 2015; Jancovich, 2017). 
 
But despite this sustained critique and the failure to deliver noteworthy changes in 
patterns of cultural participation, there is limited evidence of significant changes in 
how cultural policy is executed in the UK or in the distribution of funding to cultural 
organisations. For all the rhetoric, what little has been done has arguably remained on 
the periphery, involving relatively small levels of investment in short term projects. 
This chapter examines why policies to support cultural participation appear to be so 
hard to change. It will do so by taking a historical approach, for as Foucault notes, for 
a problematisation to have formed something prior “must have happened to make it 
uncertain, to make it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of 
difficulties about it” (2003 [1984], p.24). As such, this chapter aims to identify when 
practice around cultural participation became problematic and the conditions under 
which this occurred. Specifically, it will consider whether, rather than being a 
problem to be solved, the continuing existence of so-called cultural non-participation 
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is in fact central to maintaining the status quo and affirming taken for granted power 
relationships within cultural policy.  
 
Understanding the arts as an institution  
It is important to remember that although this chapter is analysing the construction of 
a problem within what is commonly called cultural policy, this is a fairly recent 
description for what would have been understood in many countries, throughout the 
twentieth century as arts policy (Craik, 2007).  While there is much debate about 
participation that focuses on what should be funded, this makes the arts reducible to a 
fixed list of activities that the label is or is not applied to rather than considering the 
label as an object in its own right. As such, debate tends to focus on asking what are 
the arts rather than what is the arts? However, an Arts Council England study found 
that some people perceived an ontological difference between ‘art’ and ‘the arts’ (Arts 
Council England, 2008) with many appearing to see ‘the arts’ as something 
‘institutional’.  
 
Broadly speaking, institutions can be understood as “conventions that are self-
policing” (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 638) and which produce “stable, valued and 
recurring patterns of behaviour” (Huntington, 1965, p. 394). Within this 
understanding individual organisations can be understood as the materialised 
expression of an institution, but no organisation by itself is complete or complex 
enough to be an institution in its own right (Kangas and Vestheim, 2010). As such, 
the cultural policy bodies such as Arts Council England, local authorities, and 
delivery organisations such as museums, galleries and theatres may all be considered 
as component parts of a single institution – the arts – that in turn is a significant 
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constituent part of the manner in which power is exercised, values are distributed and 
asymmetric power relationships are maintained in society.  
 
Fairclough presents institutions as a fully conceived order of discourse that is 
“simultaneously facilitating and constraining the social action of its members: it 
provides them with a frame for action, without which they could not act, but it thereby 
constrains them to act within that frame” (1995, p. 38).  Specifically in relation to the 
arts George Dickie argues there are not a narrow group of people intentionally 
executing explicit institutionalising power, but rather there is a network of people 
employing the same body of knowledge and system of meaning to imbue certain 
objects and actions with value (Jelinek, 2013).  As such, the constituent organisations 
within the arts are simultaneously given their self-justification and constrained by the 
institution of the arts. However, institutions are not eternal and transcendent, they are 
the product of a particular time (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy, 2004).  It is necessary 
therefore to consider the historical emergence of the institutional discourses of the 
arts, to reflect on how they came into being, and to examine the central role that the 
‘problem’ of cultural participation has had throughout.  
 
The constitution of the arts as an institution   
Literature on the establishment of arts policy in the UK commonly focuses on the 
setting up of the Arts Council of Great Britain in 1946 and the creation of regulations 
to allow local authorities to subsidise “entertainment” for their constituents in 1948 
(Hewison, 1997). However, these policy interventions and the core assumptions upon 
which they were based should be understood as having a far older discursive 
pedigree, one that was created in the late eighteenth century and which was refined 
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and entrenched as part of the civilising fervour of nineteenth century Victorians. As 
such, the issue of participation has been fundamental to these discourses from the 
outset.  
 
But as Shiner (2001) argues for the largest part of human history there was no notion 
of the arts as an independent concept as is now understood. He further argues that the 
category of the arts as it is understood today is a modern European invention 
established in the eighteenth century when the “cult of art” and the “inflated, quasi-
religious rhetoric that goes with it” came into existence. The arts was discursively 
constructed as “something that exists beyond particular societies and belongs to the 
subject of, what might be called for want of a better phrase, ‘humanity in general’” 
(Mirza, 2012, pp. 28–29). Yet despite this, the ability to interact with the arts is not 
something that humanity in general was assumed to naturally possess.  Rather, an 
appreciation of the arts was understood as a learnt sensibility that must be both 
cultivated and mediated. Furthermore, in the nineteenth century artistic skills were not 
seen as something that everyone should develop and the arts were accepted as 
something created by “a leisured class with plenty of time and nothing required of 
them” but to create and define art for the rest (Upchurch, 2004, p. 206). 
 
This approach was challenged at the time by the likes of William Morris (1882) who 
espoused universal creative expression, or art in the everyday, where the professional 
artist (or artisan in his terminology) was not someone from a privileged elite, but a 
worker. This thinking is also present in the work of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels 
who describe an ideal society as one “in which there are no painters but … people 
who engage in painting [or art]” (Marx and Engels quoted in Bourdieu, 1984, p. 397). 
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Such thinking influenced a long tradition of grassroots participatory practices and 
workers’ education classes that grew up within the Labour movement and gave rise to 
high levels of and investment in cultural activity in Britain throughout the twentieth 
century (Keaney, 2006a) until the decline of both the nationalised industries and trade 
unions.   
 
But it was the notion of the aesthetic as a specific type of experience (Shiner, 2001) 
that became integral to the modern conception of the arts. Associated to this was the 
conception of the individual who was not having these experiences, and whose life 
was all the worse for it. This discursive identity has developed over time into that of 
today’s cultural non-participant.  
 
Yet if the discursive logic of the arts requires the existence of the cultural non-
participant then their non-participation should not be seen as a ‘problem’ for the arts. 
Indeed it is something that is to be expected. It would not be until the arts entered into 
a policy relationship with the state that the non-participation of non-participants 
would become a ‘problem’. For  as the arts became an institution of the state, the non-
participant would act as the primary boundary object (Star and Griesemer, 1989) 
around which different discourses could coalesce and legitimate the presence of the 
state in the management and regulation of the choices of its citizens.  
 
The arts and the state  
It would be more than a century after the establishment of the institution of the arts, as 
defined above, before a formal relationship with the state would finally be 
established. Until late in the nineteenth century, the dominant feeling remained that 
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“as long as the market was seen to be meeting the needs of the public [then there was 
no real need for the state] to become involved with an activity that was perceived to 
depend upon individual taste and fashion” (Gray, 2000, p. 38). Yet over time, and 
through the lobbying of influential figures from within the professional arts, there was 
a significant ideological shift that situated the private lives of the populace within the 
purview of the state more so than had ever been the case previously (Toleda Silva, 
2015). One of the inspirations for this were the public museums built in the nineteenth 
century and intended to provide access for the public to collections that had hitherto 
been the preserve of the ruling classes. At a time of mass industrialisation, 
urbanisation, and social division these museums and galleries would play a vital role 
in attempts by the state to define a shared culture (Appleton, 2001). This aim also 
contributed to the increasing professionalization of cultural practice in which an elite 
of “academy-trained gentleman artist[s] of the middle or upper classes” (Upchurch, 
2005, p. 510), would paternalistically grant access to the arts for wider society, in the 
hope it would have a civilising effect on all mankind.  
 
By the end of the Second World War the British Government would shift from a 
strategy of casual patronage to direct intervention, what Minihan (1977) describes as 
the nationalisation of culture, and which significantly happened alongside the setting 
up of the welfare state, and its principle of universality (Coates and Lawler, 2000). 
Operationally, this took the form of the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB), 
formed in 1946 as a successor to two wartime organisations, the Entertainment 
National Services Association (ENSA) and the Council for the Encouragement of 
Music and the Arts (CEMA) (Hewison, 1997). Both had operated independently 
during the Second World War, but their focuses had been different.  ENSA’s main 
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activities in wartime had been the entertainment of troops, touring to improve public 
morale and setting up local arts clubs and associations where people could participate 
in artistic practice. CEMA, in contrast, had focused on protecting cultural heritage 
through storing and preserving national treasures and providing work for actors and 
artists during troubled times.  When the Arts Council was formed at the end of the 
war it absorbed the duties of both organisations, but its direction was shaped by the 
personal and political influence of John Maynard Keynes, the previous Chair of 
CEMA, who now chaired the Arts Council. As such its interests were most clearly 
aligned to the aims of this body and as a result one of their first acts was to stop 
ENSA’s support for touring and amateur arts clubs. 
As a liberal politically, Keynes was distrustful of an overarching state, so he separated 
the decision making process from government, arguing instead for an approach, 
known as the arm’s length principle which has been widely exported internationally 
(Upchurch, 2011). The arm’s length principle has been defined as a “system of 
separation of powers and of “checks and balances” fundamental to a pluralistic 
democracy, [where] money voted by parliament is granted to…quasi independent 
bodies [to] determine their own policies and spending choices” (Landry and 
Matarasso, 1999, p. 23). But far from providing checks and balances to ensure the 
accountability of decision making, this chapter argues that this has resulted in cultural 
policy being riddled with vested interests and conflicts of interest from within the 
artistic community. The result is an arts policy that is inherently concerned with 
supporting artistic independence for a professional class of artists, rather than the 
universal creativity or participation of society in general. 
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However, as Gray (2000) notes, in a laissez-faire free market economy, when the state 
intervenes in society it must be seen to be for a purpose and the outcomes must also 
be seen to be legitimate themselves. As such, justification for public subsidy and the 
legitimacy of a professional cultural elite making decisions about how that money 
was spent had to be integrated into the institutional discourses of the arts. Adhering to 
a strict division between the aesthetic and the corporeal was problematic to sustain if 
the arts was to be granted public support on the basis of providing a unique and 
societally useful transformative experience. Therefore, the introduction of explicit 
state funding for the arts necessitated the adaptation of its founding institutional 
discourses. 
 
Discursive legitimation  
Legitimacy is a social, cultural and performative process and legitimation, it is argued 
is a necessary part of the work undertaken by publicly funded organisations (Larsson 
2016). This work is shaped by the institutional environment in which the organisation 
exists  (Meyer and Rowan 1977) and according to Taylor and Van Every (1993) the 
legitimate status of institutions depends on the maintenance and adaptation of  the 
discourses upon which the institution relies for meaning, status, and power. 
Institutional agents manage this process through the on-going production of symbolic 
communication that leaves traces (Taylor and Van Every, 1993). These traces act as a 
signal to others that the actions of the institution are legitimate and through their 
pervasiveness they act as a barrier to the unmanaged entry into the field of new 
discourses that present alternative realities or legitimate alternate institutions.  
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However, as McGuigan notes: “no discourse is ever closed off entirely from other 
discourses or without internally disruptive elements” (2004, p.35). This means that 
structural and cultural changes in society can pose a threat to institutions as they can 
cause shifting relationships between discourses that may challenge their taken for 
granted status. In particular, institutions face difficulties where there is a need to 
secure transference of existing constructions of reality to new communities or 
generations that have their own system of meanings upon which they could establish 
new, and ultimately competing, institutions (Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy, 2004).  
Institutional agents can chose to adapt the behaviour of the institution to such societal 
pressure for change, and/or execute strategies that defend the established beliefs and 
patterns of behaviour on which they depend for their existence (Kangas and 
Vestheim, 2010). This chapter argues that in regards the institution of the arts it is the 
second option that has most commonly been adopted by its agents. This is particularly 
evident in relation to the ‘problem’ of participation within cultural policy, where 
institutional agents have adapted existing discourses or co-opted new ones in order to 
construct refreshed “explanations and justifications for the fundamental elements of 
their collective, institutionalised existence” (Boyce, 1996, p. 5).   
 
As stated, from the outset, in order to be seen as a legitimate site for state 
intervention, the arts were recognised for “their contribution to national prestige, and 
their role in civilising the population” (Gray, 2000). As such, and up until the nineteen 
seventies, state subsidy for the arts was discursively justified in two primary ways. 
One strand focused on representing access to the arts and the unique experience that 
this afforded as an inalienable right. State subsidies for the arts were therefore 
represented as part of an egalitarian process of democratizing mainstream culture 
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(Mulcahy, 2006; Landry and Matarasso, 1999; Evrard, 1997). This approach to the 
concept of participation shifted the emphasis from that within political science, which 
defines participation as being about power and decision making to a more neutered 
version within the cultural sector that is about taking part in cultural activities. 
 
But this strand gained legitimacy from the wider post-war European discourses of the 
redistributive welfare state (McGuigan, 2004) where the core assumption is that the 
wealth (both tangible and intangible) of a society should be evenly distributed 
amongst its population, rather than the means of production. Those activities, objects, 
and organisations that had already been discursively written upon by the arts as being 
of unique aesthetic value were now represented as being part of the intangible wealth 
of the nation and should not therefore be the preserve of any one group. State 
intervention could therefore be justified in order to facilitate the equal dispersal of the 
means of consumption and the cultural non-participant functions as the necessary 
subject to which such redistribution can occur.  
 
However, the egalitarian sentiment of the democratisation discourse was also bound 
to a more pragmatic second strand of discursive justification.  This strand  sought to 
make clear how the provision of the unique aesthetic experience that the arts claimed 
to be able to provide would have a useful impact on society. Like the institution of the 
arts itself, the logics of this discourse can be traced to the nineteenth when Utilitarians 
such as Francis Hutchison and Jeremy Bentham were asserting that the role of the 
state was to seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number. However, Bentham’s 
anointed prodigy, John Stuart Mill, proposed that there existed two tiers of pleasure. 
The pleasure of intellectual and moral actions was of greater value than the 
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supposedly simple pleasures gained through acts that required less cognitive 
engagement – therefore participation in entertainment is most certainly not equal to 
participation in the arts. Rather than happiness, the result of simple pleasure was 
better understood as contentment and thus ultimately of lesser value (Mill, 2001 
[1863]). Mill believed the pursuit of the higher pleasures was not only of greater 
intrinsic value to the individual, but that those who pursued such pleasure would be of 
greater value to society. Of course, the converse of this logic is that those who do not 
pursue these higher pleasures, those who might now be labelled as cultural non-
participants, are likely to be of less value to society.  
 
These claims had discursive strength because of the extent to which they made 
explicit use of the existing dividing practices (Danaher, Schirato and Webb, 2000) 
that were already used to delineate society. Two existing discursive identities became 
mutually self-affirming because those most deprived socially were identified as not 
having been exposed to the arts, their lack of exposure to the arts in turn seen as a 
contributing factor to their social deprivation. By association, the supposed cultural 
non-participation of these individuals becomes part of the wider problematisation of 
their societal disengagement and in so doing gains legitimacy as a site for state 
intervention. Subsidising the arts can therefore be justified on the basis of providing 
access to opportunities for these necessary interactions to occur, both in order to help 
more people transform into effective and productive citizens and to maintain the 
contributions of those, who by virtue of their existing participation, have already been 
transformed.  
 
Challenging the dominant discourses 
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However, by the 1970s the pre-eminence of these discourses was being contested. 
The growth in the number of universities providing higher education in the 1960s and 
the development of cultural studies within universities began to challenge the cultural 
hegemony created by a predefined great tradition in the context of a society that was 
itself becoming increasingly heterogeneous (Williams, 1983; Willis, 1990). Academic 
debate was re-oriented from a focus on appreciation of the artist’s intention towards 
an examination of the way that the public respond to and interpret the work. This shift 
coincided with broader social and cultural changes taking place at the time. Not least, 
in the 1970s Britain becoming an increasingly multicultural society meaning that 
there were many new voices wanting to be heard. Increasingly, therefore, there was 
talk not of one culture but many cultures. This more relativist definition challenges 
the institution of the arts by invoking a broader notion of culture than had previously 
been the case. As such, the notion of a single artistic canon came under sustained 
critique for the extent to which it, and the institution of the arts, ignore or de-value 
alternative cultural traditions and those who create them (Khan, 1978). 
 
Alongside this, a new generation of young artists, experimenting with new art forms, 
and a politically active and articulate community arts movement grew up. This was 
partly in response to the decline of workplace-based creative activity, which resulted 
from the privatisation or closure of many traditional industries, such as the coal 
industry, which, through the National Coal Board, had been significant funders of 
creative activity among the working classes (Ashworth, 1986). Practitioners working 
within this context adopted an approach to participation that more closely reflected a 
need for people’s participation in decision-making.  They called for arts policy to 
change its support for the self-interest of the arts and to respond in a similar vein 
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(Braden, 1978). Likewise, in response to criticism of the London bias of the national 
Arts Council, Regional Arts Associations started to flex their power. By dint of their 
accountability to an electorate through their associations with local authority 
members, many were much more open to a dialogue with local artists and community 
groups.  This created a two-tier approach to cultural policy (Hutchison, 1982) that 
often challenged the national arts policy prioritisation of classical art forms by 
supporting greater cultural pluralism and increased grassroots activity locally. But 
despite this, little fundamentally altered in regards to the dominant logics of what 
national cultural policy should be or how it should be executed.  
 
For example, in 2004 Arts Council England reviewed their funding, claiming a 
priority was to address participation.  However after the review there is evidence that 
85% of the financial support that they provided continued to be given to the same 
organisations as before  Likewise,  in 2010 when policy discourse further emphasised 
the need to increase participation there is evidence that participatory arts organisations 
were worst hit in austerity cuts (Jancovich, 2017).  
 
This is not to say that attempts to change have not been made. The New Labour 
government who were in power 1997-2010 attempted to find a compromise between 
different approaches in order to ‘fix’ the ‘problem’. They looked beyond the 
traditional arts agencies, such as the Arts Council, to broader public policy agents, 
such as its social inclusion unit, for guidance on the development of cultural policy. 
Local Authorities also continued their interest in this arena, and by the end of this 
period were investing at least as much if not more than the Arts Council themselves. 
However, the status quo has continued to be exceptionally resilient to such 
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interventions. Not least because the third way (Giddens, 2000) principles of New 
Labour meant that rather than challenging a policy model based on hierarchy and 
expertise, new policies sought an accommodation between the differing factions. This 
accommodation was to be achieved through partnership working.  
 
Inherent in the notion of partnership is an attempt to govern by consensus between 
different interest groups. This requires consultation with a wider range of voices than 
may be defined by top-down government, or indeed than make up the cultural elite 
who had been so influential in arts policy since the Second World War.  Yet while the 
government might suggest the need for a wider range of voices to be involved in 
decision making in the arts, the arm’s length principle limits government’s capacity to 
determine in what way this should be implemented.  Instead, the way policy would be 
implemented and spoken about continues to be left to agencies such as the Arts 
Councils themselves to determine. In turn, this leads to tokenistic consultation 
masquerading as participation in policy making.  
 
For example, although Arts Council England has conducted research around their 
decision-making processes, including undertaking deliberative consultation, the 
purpose of this process was to measure the value stakeholders currently have of the 
arts (Keaney et al., 2007; ICM Unlimited, 2015).  This misses the point that in order 
to challenge institutionalisation such participatory methods must be allowed to 
produce learning that may change both the values and indeed the practices of the arts 
themselves. Instead, the tokenistic approaches employed fail to “explain what [the 
arts] does to create value or whether [it] might create more or different value if it did 
things differently” (Keaney, 2006b, p. 40). In this case, there is little evidence that 
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Arts Council England used it to explore how it might change itself.  Rather, the 
primary outcome was that it changed how they communicated both internally and 
externally about their activity and devolved the problem of institutional change 
further down the chain, by asking the organisations it funds to address the problem of 
its “crisis of legitimacy” (Holden, 2006). This is indicative of the discursive 
adaptation by which the institution of the arts is able to neutralise criticism while 
remaining relevant to the dominant discourses of the state at any given time.  
 
The on-going process of discursive legitimation produces new discourses but the 
creation and adoption of one does not result in the abandonment of another. As Talja 
(1999a) notes, there are always several more-or-less conflicting discourses existing in 
a particular field of knowledge or institution and “that is why discourses are internally 
relatively coherent, but mutually contradictory and alternative” (Talja, 1999b, p. 468). 
Indeed, as stated previously, an institution can be strengthened by the presence of 
multiple discourses upon which its agents can draw, in particular if these discourses 
share commonalities to which each can refer. As such, the discursive strand of the 
unique transformative experience of the arts and the association of the cultural non-
participant with those identities that the state represents as problematic are both still 
part of the discursive legitimation work being done by the arts today. This has 
allowed the arts to intertwine its own logics with the dominant discourses of the state 
very effectively in a process that Gray has described as policy attachment (2004) and 
Belfiore as defensive instrumentalism (2012).  
 
So, while the state may no longer be faced with the threat of anarchy from the 
uneducated masses of the industrial revolution (Arnold, 2009) in a neo-liberal 
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meritocracy the responsibility for personal and social happiness has shifted from the 
state to the individual. Personal growth, self-improvement and well-being are all key 
elements of the dominant discourses of social mobility and individual aspiration. 
Every citizen is expected to increase their social capital through taking part in civic or 
cultural activities (Putnam, 2000).  Failure to do so implies a deficit, not in the service 
provided but in the individual participant. This dovetails perfectly with the discursive 
identity of the cultural non-participant and so the arts has positioned itself as being 
well placed to help those with a cultural ‘deficit’ (Gilmore, 2013) to overcome the 
‘barriers’ (Stevenson, 2013) they face to ‘taking-part’ (Jancovich, 2017). In turn, 
government performance targets were created to assess how well the publicly funded 
arts organisations were achieving this goal. 
 
Yet it has been shown that the extent to which such interventions have any 
meaningful long-term effect on social inequity is questionable (Belfiore, 2009) 
Bourdieu (1984) argues that all forms of capital are in fact by definition finite and 
kept in short supply under capitalism. He contends that differences in levels of capital 
are how social divisions are sustained, and the dominant class will continually find 
ways to maintain distinctions between those who have and those who have not. 
Increasing participation in the arts, rather than participation in decision-making does 
not reduce these social divisions, but simply reduces the value placed on the artistic 
practice that has become more ‘inclusive’ while those with the greatest privilege 
adopt a different practice to maintain their distinction.  If this is true then it may be 
argued that the arts as an institution exists to perpetuate inequality. Therefore, cultural 
policy, when allied to the arts, can never deliver increased participation, let alone the 
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universality implied by the social contract originally conceived in its association with 
the welfare state. 
 
A discursive knot threatening discursive coherence  
In attempting to convince of the naturalness of the institution of the arts continuing 
position of privilege with the state, cultural participation has increasingly had 
competing and contradictory meanings. Likewise, the arts has become more vaguely 
defined as “a mélange of cultural forms […] while still being touted as powerful 
medicine for whatever ails society” (Jensen 2002, p.148). Both Jensen (Jensen, 2002) 
and Shiner (Shiner, 2001) see such discursive work as a highly successful act of self-
preservation by those who can exert the most power in the field. However, over time 
this adoption and interweaving of discourses can result in a discursive knot (Wodak, 
2007) that becomes increasingly complex and ostensibly contradictory. A complexity 
that itself starts to risk the discursive coherence of the institution they were employed 
to defend. Binding the eighteenth century discourses of the arts to modern discourses 
of social democratic redistribution, neo-liberal service provision, the free market of 
the creative industries, and the need to provide people and communities more agency 
in decisions that affect their lives, has left the arts somewhat Janus faced. The arts 
must be seen as unique but ubiquitous, exclusive but inclusive, not for everyone but 
for anyone, in need of state aid but a driver of the economy. It must be seen to respect 
diverse cultural values while simultaneously finding something wrong with the 
cultural values of certain problematic individuals that needs rectifying and which only 
the arts can do. 
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The discourse of democratising culture had been based on the logics of a knowing 
elite bringing the best to the most. However, diffusing the understanding of what the 
best is in order to say that the most are being reached means that the “cultural 
democracy movement led unwittingly to the erosion of the social-democratic project 
from the inside” (McGuigan, 2004, p.41). Likewise, if the activities that are legitimate 
within the discourses of the creative industries and abundant everyday participation 
are adopted as legitimate modes of cultural participation then they must be accepted 
as offering the same unique type of experience as that which one could previously 
only gain through an encounter with the arts. Given the abundance of such activities 
the subject identity of a cultural non-participant and the need for state sponsored 
cultural intermediaries to encourage their participation would be increasingly difficult 
to sustain (Stevenson, 2013). Instead, a new  justification for why the state continues 
to be involved in cultural policy at all would need to be formulated, one which would 
need to focus on  what the state is investing in rather than who is participating. 
 
Yet the idea of the arts as a separate field of human activity, on which only members 
from within the arts can speak, continues to persist in cultural policy. It has not been 
assimilated into an anthropological discourse as just another form of social activity 
and thus simply one manifestation of the multiplicity of cultures that exist within 
society. Discursive boundaries may change but that does not mean that boundaries no 
longer exist. Although the range of objects and activities that can be understood as the 
arts has significantly expanded, it remains the case that they are judged according to 
the rules and logics of the arts, from which they become considered as an example of 
just how diverse, and thus inclusive, the arts can be.  
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Maintaining the existence of the cultural non-participant negates the need to ever 
definitively explain what these people are doing with their time and what the 
alternative activities are that they are inevitably already  participating in. Instead, 
discursively affirming the existence of the cultural non-participant in text, speech and 
practice implicitly defines cultural participation as a distinct social activity that it is 
possible not to do. Just as Danto (1964) reached the conclusion that while anything 
could be art, not everything was, so too it may be argued that while anything can be 
cultural participation, not everything is. It is this logic that is vital in protecting the 
institution of the arts from the oblivion of meaninglessness that the ongoing 
discursive legitimation work of its agents has risked invoking.  
 
For no matter which claims about the impact of state subsidies for the arts are made, 
they almost all rely on participation. “Art which no-one wants to use is not an 
addition to the nation’s wealth” (Pinnock, 2006, p.175, emphasis in original). While 
there are arguments about the value of public subsidy for the arts that on face value do 
not depend on use – legacy and bequest, prestige, option value (Holden, 2004, 2006) 
– in actuality they remain dependent upon a presumption of use by somebody at some 
point. Something that provides benefits for some rather than all would struggle to 
legitimately lay claim to public subsidy in a liberal democracy. At a minimum it 
should be clear that while all might not be making use of it now, they value the option 
to be able to make use of it later and cannot gain the same benefits elsewhere. The 
existence of the discursive identity of the cultural non-participant ensures that while 
some may not participate with any of the physical manifestations of the arts, they 
have no choice but to participate in the institutional discourses of the arts and the 
logics that they reproduce. For such individuals are unknowingly taken into the 
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dispositive and are written upon by its discourses. Having become objects in the 
discourse, they both legitimate the continued financial support of the state for the 
institution that has co-opted culture for itself, and affirm the privileged position of the 
cultural professionals whose social status this institution supports.  
 
Conclusions: The right to speak within the field of cultural policy  
If cultural participation is less about the specifics of what cultural activity is 
considered valuable to participate in and more about where the activity is discursively 
located by those that are legitimated to speak within the field of cultural policy, then it 
follows that cultural policy needs to refocus its interest in participation from 
participation in culture, to participation in decision-making processes. The principles 
of participatory decision making have their roots in the work on deliberative 
democracy which John Parkinson defines as “public reasoning between citizens” 
(Parkinson, 2006, p. 1). Mark Bevir and R.A.W Rhodes (2010) argue that such 
approaches can challenge institutional logics, where the actors involved in decision 
making are changed and are involved in setting the agenda.  
 
In many senses the arm’s length principle common to arts and cultural policy in the 
UK appears to fit this principle of deliberative decision making working outside state 
control. However, just like the governments that fund them, arm’s length bodies have 
tended to adopt the principles of Third Way politics in which finding technical 
solutions through supposed consensus is accepted as the best way to remove politics 
and allow for rational, evidence based decision to be made (Fairclough, 2000). 
However, as has been argued throughout this chapter, by its nature the requirements 
of consensus politics ignore the influence of the specific agents actually involved in 
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interpreting and implementing policy, such as the Arts Council or the cultural leaders 
of key organisations. When the plurality of interests and power relationships within 
decision making groups are ignored, it leads to a built-in bias towards maintaining the 
status quo. But where the approach not only allows, but actively seeks out dissent, 
rather than consensus, through the inclusion of other forms of discourse such as 
argument, rhetoric, humour, emotion, testimony or storytelling, and gossip 
(Markovits, 2006), it may provide a mechanism for hearing less powerful voices and 
bringing about institutional change.  
Rather than trying to find consensus across an imagined cultural sector, an alternative 
would therefore be to actively seek out and understand key conceptual and ideological 
differences within the range of cultural practices that exist. Such an approach may be 
central to avoid ignoring the ‘insidious and often hidden connections between culture 
and power’ (McGuigan, 2004, p. 141). However, to truly achieve such an objective 
would require organisations to “enable the anti-institutional diversification of value” 
(Connor, 1992, p. 4) that would undermine their own elevated status and privilege. 
For all that the majority of those working within the arts may claim progressive 
intentions, as Gartman notes, in practice they “have no interest in eliminating cultural 
authority per se, but merely in securing a greater share of it for themselves” (Gartman, 
no date, p. 439). As such, they opt to continue to conserve and reproduce the values 
on which their existence relies through their management of the discourses that give 
their practice meaning. As Connor notes, once established “only an institution can 
dissolve itself” (Connor, 1992) and this is the paradox at the heart of supposedly 
liberal arts institutions orientated towards equality.  
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However, the capacity to engender the change that is required in order to advance a 
more culturally equitable society is significantly limited because of the difficulties of 
thinking outside the institutional discourses of the arts and the discursive logics upon 
which its relationship with the state is based. One cannot truly question the arts from 
within its discursive logic. It is perhaps therefore time to develop new logics that start 
with equity, rather than the arts and which offer support for people to participate in 
decisions that affect their lives, ensuring resourcing for what they already choose to 
participate in. The first step would be to abandon the discursive identity of the non-
participant, which is an act of micro power that suppresses the capacity of many to 
speak within the field of cultural policy. Until this happens cultural policy will 
continue to favour how cultural professionals define what cultural participation 
should be. This matters, because as Jensen reminds us, “if we live by stories, and seek 
the best stories by which to live, then we must first figure out what stories we are 
already telling ourselves, so that we can decide if we like where they are taking us” 
(2002, p.117). The persistence of a story about cultural non-participants means that as 
Garnham pointed out in 1983, “one cannot understand the culture of our time or the 
challenges and opportunities which that dominant culture offers to public policy-
makers” (cited in McGuigan, 2004, chap.42). The asymmetric power relationship 
upon which the arts was established as an institution means for all that the rhetoric of 
cultural policy is saturated with liberal, egalitarian and even revolutionary ideas, these 
ideas will all inevitably flounder in “the gap between the “juridical people and the 
empirical people […] the ideal and the real, the utopian and the present” (Miller and 
Yudice, 2002, p.25). Cultural policy will remain permanently orientated towards the 
operation of sedimented values while failing to adequately acknowledge the 
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imperative to value that is a fundamental aspect of life (Connor, 1992) and integral to 
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